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THE PUBLIC SAFETY (PUBLIC 
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POST-SENTENCE DETENTION OF SEX 
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HUMAN RIGHTS? 
Jasmin Moran* 
This article examines the human rights consistency of the Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) 
Bill 2012. The Bill proposes a new scheme to detain recidivist sex offenders beyond the expiration 
of their finite sentences, if they are seen as highly likely to reoffend. Despite obvious human rights 
concerns, the Attorney-General issued a statement contending the Bill was consistent with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The article analyses the correctness of that statement, with a 
particular focus on whether the Bill establishes a form of civil committal and is, in substance, 
different to prison detention.  
I INTRODUCTION 
On 29 August 2012, New Zealand's most notorious sex offender, Stewart Murray Wilson, the 
so-called "Beast of Blenheim", was released from prison.1 Wilson was convicted in 1996 of a host 
of heinous offences committed over 25 years, including seven counts of rape and charges of 
bestiality, indecent assault, ill treatment of children and stupefaction.2 Although Heron J thought 
preventive detention was appropriate, it could only be imposed in respect of a rape offence 
occurring after 1 September 1993.3 It was not certain Wilson's offending satisfied this requirement 
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1  Anne-Marie Everson "'Beast' free, release plan still unclear" The Wanganui Chronicle (online ed, 
Wanganui, 29 August 2012).  
2  R v Wilson HC Wellington T-104-95, 15 March 1996 at 1–2. 
3  R v Wilson, above n 2, at 6–7. 
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and Heron J was forced to impose a finite sentence of 21 years.4 When Wilson's final release date 
approached, he had to be released, despite being assessed as highly likely to sexually reoffend and 
having been repeatedly denied parole on that basis.5 Wilson was released subject to various 
conditions imposed by the Parole Board until 2015 and from thereafter, an extended supervision 
order (ESO).6 
Wilson, and other similar offenders, who are not sentenced to preventive detention, but who are 
evaluated as overwhelmingly likely to sexually reoffend at the end of their sentences, present a 
quandary for the New Zealand justice system. Under the status quo, these offenders must be 
released and may be subject to similar restrictions as Wilson received. However, these restrictions 
are seen by some as insufficient to protect the public from the serious harm posed by such offenders. 
To combat this perceived public safety issue, the National-led Government introduced the Public 
Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill (the Bill), to Parliament on 18 September 2012.7 The Bill 
would enable the High Court to make a public protection order (PPO) detaining an individual who 
has completed their finite sentence but poses a very high risk of reoffending. At the time of writing, 
the Bill was before the Justice and Electoral Committee having passed its first reading by a vote of 
106–14.8 This article was concluded before the release of the Justice and Electoral Committee's 
report in April 2014. 
While there are sound policy reasons for the Bill, namely public protection, it raises serious 
human rights issues with regards to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). The 
National-led Government and the Attorney-General, the Hon Christopher Finlayson MP, have both 
issued statements to the effect that the Bill is NZBORA compliant.9 The purpose of this paper is to 
test the veracity of this claim. 
This discussion will proceed in three parts. First, the conceptual foundations of the Bill, penal 
populism and public attitudes towards sex offenders, will be discussed. Secondly, the New Zealand 
case law and sources related to the human rights consistency of the Bill with NZBORA will be 
  
4  At 6.  
5  New Zealand Parole Board Wilson - Stewart Murray – Review of s 107 order Under s 107(6) of the Parole 
Act 2002 (29 April 2011); New Zealand Parole Board Wilson - Stewart Murray – Review of s 107 order 
Under s 107(6) of the Parole Act 2002 (17 October 2011); New Zealand Parole Board Wilson - Stewart 
Murray – Parole hearing Under s 107(6) of the Parole Act 2002 (30 March 2012).  
6  New Zealand Parole Board Wilson – Stewart Murray – Parole hearing Under s 104(FRD) of the Parole Act 
2002 (7 August 2012).  
7  Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012 (68-1) [Public Safety Bill]. 
8  The Green Party and Mana voted against the Bill. See (18 September 2013) 693 NZPD 13480. 
9  Christopher Finlayson Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill – Consistency with the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (14 October 2012); New Zealand Government "Q+A – Public Safety (Public 
Protection Orders) Bill" (press release, 18 September 2012). 
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analysed. These sources will then be compared to case law from the United States and Australia, 
both of which have similar post-sentence detention schemes for sex offenders. The conclusion 
reached is that while the Bill does pose human rights concerns, it achieves an appropriate balance 
between human rights and public protection.  
II THE PUBLIC SAFETY (PUBLIC PROTECTION ORDERS) 
BILL 2012 
A Purpose of the Bill 
The Bill is framed in terms of public protection rather than punishment. The Bill explicitly 
disclaims that its objective is to punish former offenders.10 Instead, the established purpose is to 
protect the public from almost certain serious sexual or violent harm.11 A Government press release 
emphasises this point, stating, "[d]etention would be protective rather than punitive": "PPOs are… 
not criminal punishments".12 As such, one of the principles included in the Bill is that individuals 
subject to a PPO should have "as much autonomy and quality of life as possible".13 
B Requirements for the Imposition of a PPO 
To be eligible for a PPO, an individual must be 18 years or older, detained under a determinate 
sentence for a serious sexual or violent offence and be within six months of his or her release.14 An 
individual subject to the most serious form of an ESO is also eligible.15 The Chief Executive of the 
Department of Corrections can apply to the High Court for a PPO in respect of such individuals if 
there is a high risk of imminent serious sexual or violent offending.16 In the application, the Chief 
Executive must include at least two reports prepared by health assessors, including a registered 
psychologist, that address whether such a risk exists and whether the individual exhibits a high level 
of four behavioural characteristics.17 These characteristics are specified in cl 13 as: 
(a) an intense urge to commit a particular form of offending; 
(b) limited self-regulatory capacity, evidenced by general impulsiveness, high emotional 
reactivity, and inability to cope with, or manage, stress and difficulties; 
  
10  Public Safety Bill, cl 4.  
11  Clause 4. See also Public Safety Bill (explanatory note) at 1.  
12  New Zealand Government, above n 9, at 2 and 4. 
13  Clause 5. 
14  Clause 7. 
15  Clause 7.  
16  Clause 8.  
17  Clause 9.  
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(c) absence of understanding or concern for the impact of offending on actual or potential 
victims; and 
(d) poor interpersonal relationships or social isolation or both.18 
The High Court can issue a PPO if satisfied the individual meets the threshold and there is a 
very high risk of imminent serious sexual or violent offending.19 To do this, the Court must find the 
individual exhibits a severe disturbance in behavioural functioning, established by a high level of 
the above four characteristics.20 
Once issued, a review panel established under the Bill must frequently review a PPO.21 
Additionally, within the first five years of a PPO, the Court must review the continuing justification 
for the order, including the individual's eligibility for release.22 An individual subject to a PPO can 
apply to the Court to conduct such a review.23 
C Conditions of Detention under a PPO 
Individuals subject to a PPO, known as "residents", are to be detained in a residence: a secure 
facility on prison grounds.24 Residents have the rights of individuals not subject to a PPO, except to 
the extent the Bill limits those rights.25 All residents are entitled to earnings from work, to vote, to 
access the media and to obtain a benefit.26 Residents have the right to receive visits, and written and 
oral communications from people outside the residence, although such visits and communications 
can be withheld or monitored.27 Residents also have the right to rehabilitative treatment.28 While a 
resident's rights can be limited, such decisions must be guided by reasonableness, proportionality 
and giving effect to the resident's autonomy and quality of life.29 The Bill also makes provisions for 
  
18  Clause 13.  
19  Clause 13.  
20  Clause 13.  
21  Clause 14.  
22  Clauses 15 and 17.  
23  Clause 14.  
24  Clauses 3, 18 and 99.  
25  Clause 24. 
26  Clauses 25, 27, 30, 34. 
27  Clauses 29, 31, 41–48.  
28  Clause 33. 
29  Clause 24. 
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searches of the resident, and drug and alcohol tests.30 In strict circumstances, a resident can be 
placed in seclusion or restrained.31 
When a resident begins their stay, the residence manager must, in consultation with the resident, 
assess their needs. This must take into account the cultural or religious needs of the resident, the 
steps to be taken to facilitate their rehabilitation or reintegration into the community and the 
resident's own aspirations for personal development.32 A management plan, based on this 
assessment, is then to be created, setting out factors including applicable treatment programmes, the 
nature and extent of supervision required, and a programme contributing towards the resident's 
release and reintegration.33 
D Prison Detention Orders 
On application by the Chief Executive of Corrections, the Court can order an individual subject 
to a PPO be detained in a prison instead of a residence.34 The Court can only do so if it is satisfied 
the individual would pose an unacceptably high risk to himself or others if detained in a residence 
and all other less restrictive options have been considered and appropriate options tried.35 An 
individual subject to a prison detention order (PDO) is to be treated as a prisoner awaiting trial and 
has all the rights conferred on residents by the Bill to the extent those rights are compatible with the 
applicable provisions of the Corrections Act 2004.36 As with PPOs, PDOs are subject to frequent 
review by the review panel and the Court.37 An individual can apply to the Court for the 
cancellation of the order.38 
E Protective Supervision Orders 
If the Court is satisfied an individual no longer poses a high risk of imminent serious or sexual 
or violent offending, the Court must cancel the PPO and impose a protective supervision order 
  
30  Clauses 57–58. 
31  Clauses 61–62. 
32  Clause 38. 
33  Clause 39. 
34  Clause 72. 
35  Clause 72.  
36  Clause 73.  
37  Clauses 74–75. 
38  Clause 76.  
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(PSO).39 After five years, if an individual has not breached the PSO or reoffended in a serious way, 
the PSO can be cancelled.40 
III CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE BILL 
The drastic measures imposed by the Bill can be properly understood as reflecting two concepts: 
penal populism and the prevalent public attitudes towards sex offenders. 
A Penal Populism 
1 The theory 
Anthony Bottoms first identified the concept of populist punitiveness in 1995.41 Now better 
known as penal populism, it refers to the Anglo-American trend of public support for more punitive 
responses to criminal offending.42 This derives from disillusionment with the criminal justice 
system, embodied in the perception that the rights of criminals have been prioritised over their 
victims and the public.43 Penal populism signifies the shift in the influences on criminal justice 
policy from conventional voices, such as judges and academics, to the media and law and order 
lobby groups, who more accurately represent public opinion.44 Responding to this, political parties 
propose increasingly punitive laws to appease the public, sometimes resulting in a "law and order 
auction" where parties outbid each other to win public support.45  
In New Zealand, the late 1990s marked the start of the most recent shift towards penal populism. 
John Pratt points towards three key factors that influenced this trend. The first was the media, whose 
sensationalist reporting on criminal offending mischaracterised crime and distorted public 
perceptions, creating a fear crime was increasing and the public becoming more vulnerable.46 The 
second factor was the 1999 Law and Order Referendum, which asked whether there should be 
greater emphasis on the needs of victims, and minimum sentences and hard labour for all serious 
  
39  Clause 80. 
40  Clause 89. 
41  Anthony E Bottoms "The philosophy and politics of punishment and sentencing" in Chris Clarkson and Rod 
Morgan (eds) The Politics of Sentencing Reform (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995).  
42  Wayne Martin "Popular Punitivism – The Role of the Courts in the Development of Criminal Justice 
Policies" (2010) 43 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1 at 1.  
43  Sandra Grey and Katie de Roo "When the next step is capital punishment what choices do we have: Penal 
reform movements in the age of penal populism" (2010) 25(2) New Zealand Sociology 38 at 41.  
44  John Pratt "When Penal Populism Stops: Legitimacy, Scandal and the Power to Punish in New Zealand" 
(2008) 41 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 364 at 364. 
45  Martin, above n 42, at 12; John Pratt and Marie Clark "Penal Populism in New Zealand" (2005) 7 
Punishment and Society 303 at 304.  
46  Martin, above n 42, at 11; Pratt, above n 44, at 368. 
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violent offences.47 The referendum was overwhelmingly supported by 92 per cent of the public, 
signalling the public wanted a more punitive approach to criminal justice. The emergence of penal 
populism was solidified by the 2001 formation of the law and order lobby group, the Sensible 
Sentencing Trust (SST).48 The SST quickly rose to prominence in the media and politics on a 
campaign of tougher sentences for violent offenders, based on protecting and upholding victims' 
rights.49 It remains a popular voice today.  
2 Penal populism and the Fifth National Government 
The Fifth National Government has embraced penal populism over its last two terms in 
government. Prior to the 2008 Election, the crux of National's law and order policy was "no parole 
for the worst repeat violent offenders".50 The "two strikes, no walking" policy sought to prioritise 
the public's right to safety and re-characterise parole as a privilege, not a right.51 This was given 
effect in 2010 with the implementation of the "three strikes" regime.52 "Three strikes" was 
originally an SST policy.53 
The regime limits judges' discretion in sentencing repeat serious violent offenders. On a second 
strike, the judge must order the offender serve his or her sentence without parole and on a third 
strike, must impose the maximum term of imprisonment available and order that be served without 
parole, unless to do so would be manifestly unjust.54 This is an example of penal populism because 
it demonstrates National responding to, as noted in the Regulatory Impact Statement, a "public 
concern" about repeat violent offending.55 The scheme was designed to "enhance public confidence 
in the criminal justice system" by satisfying the public's appetite for harsher punishment of these 
kinds of offenders, and in doing so, "improve public safety".56 
  
47  "Referenda" (24 May 2013) <www.elections.org.nz>. 
48  Pratt, above n 44, at 371. 
49  Grey and de Roo, above n 43, at 46. 
50  New Zealand National Party Law and Order Policy: No Parole for the Worst Repeat Violent Offenders (6 
October 2008) at 1. 
51  New Zealand National Party, above n 50, at 1.  
52  Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010.  
53  Sensible Sentencing Trust "One Weekend Four Murders! "Three Strikes" Law Would Save Lives" (press 
release, 12 December 2007); Sophie Klinger "Three Strikes for New Zealand? Repeat Offenders and the 
Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009" (2009) 15 Auckland U L Rev 248 at 248249.  
54  Sentencing Act 2002, ss 86C–86D. 
55  Ministry of Justice Regulatory Impact Statement: Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 2009 (2008) at 1. 
56  Ministry of Justice, above n 55, at 1–3. 
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Similar rhetoric was employed prior to the 2011 Election, where National's law and order policy 
focused on "protecting communities" and "building a safer New Zealand".57 One of the key election 
promises, which manifested itself as the present Bill, was to introduce a civil detention scheme for 
the country's most high-risk offenders.58 This was somewhat reactionary to the scheduled upcoming 
release of Stewart Murray Wilson in 2012, who is a prime candidate for a PPO.  
3 Penal populism and the Bill 
As Wilson's release date approached, the New Zealand public entered into a frenzy of fear and 
anger, especially in Whanganui where Wilson would be released. Some members of the public 
expressed dissatisfaction with the law. An opinion piece in The Rotorua Daily Post accurately 
captured this sentiment:59   
He doesn't deserve to be let out. Unfortunately the law won't allow that. Now the community of 
Wanganui is suffering the impacts of a weak justice system that simply opens locked cell doors just 
because the sentence is over. 
This quote is the epitome of penal populism. It remarks that the hallmark convention of any 
Western justice system, the mandatory release of an individual at the end of his or her sentence, is 
necessarily "weak". Unsurprisingly, there was extensive public support for retroactive legislation to 
keep Wilson in prison, such as the present Bill.60 This included the Whanganui District Council, 
who passed a resolution to lobby for retrospective legislation.61 
The Council did little to assuage public fear and anger, and rather, much like the media, 
encouraged these feelings to increase. Despite Wilson being subject to the strictest release 
conditions ever imposed – 17 separate conditions including GPS monitoring – Whanganui Mayor 
Annette Main questioned whether this was sufficient to keep residents safe.62 The District Council 
resolved to ban Wilson from all Council parks and other areas and to "co-ordinate a community 
  
57  New Zealand National Party Law and Order Policy: Protecting Communities (4 November 2011) 
<www.national.org.nz> at 1. 
58  New Zealand National Party, above n 57, at 7.  
59  Kelly Makiha "Editorial: Wilson should stay in prison" The Rotorua Daily Post (online ed, Rotorua, 29 
August 2012).  
60  Michael Laws "Wanganui is right to resist Beast among us" The Wanganui Chronicle (online ed, 
Whanganui, 28 August 2012).  
61  Wanganui District Council "Minutes of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Wanganui District Council held at 
6.00pm on Thursday, 16 August 2012, in the Council Chamber, Municipal Office Building, 101 Guyton 
Street, Wanganui" (16 August 2012) <www.wanganui.govt.nz> at 3409. 
62  Kieran Campbell "Mayor has fears over 'Beast' release" The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 19 
August 2012); New Zealand Parole Board Wilson - Stewart Murray – Parole hearing Under s 104(FRD) of 
the Parole Act 2002, above n 6. 
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shunning" of him by encouraging all business owners to trespass him.63 The Council also brought a 
judicial review of the Parole Board's decision to release Wilson to Whanganui, but were 
unsuccessful.64 Meanwhile, media reporting was fixated on Wilson and included sensationalist 
headlines such as "The Beast Should Never Be Freed" and assertions that Whanganui had become 
the Beast's "new hunting ground".65 At the first reading of the Bill, David Clendon MP suggested 
that the "extraordinarily irresponsible display of media reporting" and "sensationalism" concerning 
Wilson's release had "paved the way" for the Bill.66 
However, the strongest indicator of penal populism was the response from the opposition 
Labour Party. Labour's justice spokesperson, Charles Chauvel, refrained from challenging the 
premise of the Bill. Instead, his criticism focused on the Government's delay in implementation, 
which had allowed one of the "targeted offenders" – Wilson – to be released.67 Given the mass 
public support for keeping Wilson in prison, it was politically untenable for Labour to dispute the 
necessity or merits of the Bill; playing into the "law and order auction", Chauvel could only criticise 
the Government for not acting quickly enough. This approach was continued at the first reading of 
the Bill where Labour MPs criticised the Government's delay and lack of consultation, but did not 
criticise the Bill itself. Phil Goff MP went as far as to accept that the Bill was not about punishment, 
but rather protecting the community.68  
The political and public reaction to Wilson's release demonstrates penal populism remains a 
powerful force in New Zealand. In particular, it explains why the Government proposed the Bill and 
why it enjoys public support.  
B Public Attitudes Towards Sex Offenders 
1 Common misconceptions regarding sex offenders 
The public attitude towards sex offenders is typified by a perception that sex offenders are 
inherently different from other offenders.69 The reason for this is that sex offences create a moral 
  
63  Wanganui District Council, above n 61, at 3409. See also "Wanganui shop ban for Beast is back" Wanganui 
Chronicle (online ed, Wanganui, 24 August 2012). 
64  Whanganui District Council v New Zealand Parole Board [2012] NZHC 2248. 
65  Bernadette Courtney "The Beast should never be freed" The Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington, 18 
April 2012); Laws, above n 60.  
66  (17 September 2003) 693 NZPD 13441. 
67  New Zealand Labour Party "New law requires careful scrutiny, not political game playing" (press release, 
18 September 2012). 
68  (17 September 2013) 693 NZPD 13441. 
69  Brian K Payne, Richard Tewksbury and Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine "Attitudes about rehabilitating sex 
offenders: Demographic, victimization, and community-level influences" (2010) 38 JCJ 580 at 582. 
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panic, producing more public fear and anger than other crimes.70 Consequently, sex offenders are 
the most stigmatised offenders in society and are despised even by other criminals.71 They are seen 
as the worst offenders and the types of punishment sex offenders "deserve", such as registration and 
chemical castration, differ from other offenders.72 
Moreover, there is an inclination to view all sex offenders in an essentialist manner. Evidence 
does not support the view sex offenders are identical – offending differs in conduct, ranging from 
exhibitionism to rape, and the motive for and underlying causes of offending are diverse.73 
Nonetheless, sex offenders are grouped together and typically seen as predators, who prey on 
children or women, unknown to them, in a public place.74 This perception arises from the media 
portrayal of sex offenders, which is to focus on the worst instances of offending and report in a 
sensationalist way.75 In reality, while that type of offending does occur, the majority of sex 
offenders are known to their victims, as a member of family or as a friend, and the majority of 
offending takes place in or near to the victim's home.76  
However, the most pervasive and worrying misconception is that sex offenders, as a group, are 
the most likely to reoffend. It is commonly believed the rate of recidivism amongst sex offenders is 
substantially higher than other offenders.77 Many authors have held there is no conclusive evidence 
supporting this view and that instead the inverse is true.78 The public belief that sex offenders are 
highly likely to reoffend is underscored by a perception that sex offenders cannot be cured.79 
Theories have posited "sexual interests are imprinted on the brain in the same way as language" 
  
70  Darrin L Rogers and Christopher J Ferguson "Punishment and Rehabilitation Attitudes toward Sex 
Offenders Versus Nonsexual Offenders" (2011) 20 Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 395 at 
407. 
71  Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 69, at 585; J Paul Fedoroff and Beverley Moran "Myths and 
misconceptions about sex offenders" (1997) 6 The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality 263 at 263. 
72  Rogers and Ferguson, above n 70, at 397. 
73  Fedoroff and Moran, above n 71, at 275;  
74  Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 69, at 586; James F Quinn, Craig J Forsyth and Carla Mullen-
Quinn "Societal reaction to sex offenders: a review of the origins and results of the myths surrounding their 
crimes and treatment amenability" (2004) 25 Deviant Behaviour 215 at 216 and 218. 
75  Jo Thakker "Public attitudes to sex offenders in New Zealand" (2012) 18 Journal of Sexual Aggression 149 
at 151–152. 
76  Martin, above n 42, at 3; Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 69, at 586. 
77  Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 69, at 585. 
78  Thakker, above n 75, at 149; Payne, Tewksbury and Mustaine, above n 69, at 585–586. 
79  Quinn, Forsyth and Mullen-Quinn, above n 74, at 220. 
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such that if an offender has a predilection to sexually offend, it cannot be changed.80  This has 
fostered a public attitude that treatment and rehabilitation programmes are futile and resources 
should instead be shifted towards the incapacitation of sex offenders.81 While the efficacy of 
various treatment measures is yet to be properly ascertained, there is no decisive evidence sex 
offenders are incurable.82 
2 Application to the Bill 
Public perspectives of sex offenders are littered with myths and misconceptions. In a 2012 
survey, Jo Thakker confirmed the existence of these attitudes in New Zealand.83 Thakker further 
reported only 10 per cent of those surveyed could identify recent legislative changes relating to sex 
offenders, specifically, the creation of ESOs and expanded use of preventive detention.84 These 
misconceptions undoubtedly contribute towards the public support for the Bill.  
The primary effect of the Bill is to detain sex offenders beyond the expiration of their prison 
sentences. There are three reasons why the public is in favour of such a scheme. First, society 
doubts the efficacy of rehabilitation programmes, and readily believes sex offenders will reoffend if 
released. The Bill provides a pragmatic solution to this perceived problem, by preventing the worst 
sex offenders from being released, perhaps forever. Secondly, the Bill indulges the public stigma 
surrounding sex offenders by taking a harsh approach toward them. The New Zealand public wants 
these "predators" to be "locked up", which the Bill easily accomplishes. Thirdly, the belief that sex 
offenders are different to all other offenders necessitates a separate scheme to manage them, as 
provided by the Bill.  
The Wilson case exerts a large influence in this area. The notion all sex offenders are predators 
is encouraged by Wilson, who exemplifies this stereotype, having preyed on vulnerable women and 
their daughters, who he lured into his home under the pretext of friendship.85 Wilson's very 
nickname – the Beast of Blenheim – accentuates the predatory nature of his offending, as has the 
sensationalist media reporting on him, as documented above. The case also lends credence to the 
belief sex offenders are incurable. For the entirety of his 18-year sentence, Wilson refused 
treatment, showed no remorse and denied responsibility for his offending.86 As New Zealand's most 
  
80  Fedoroff and Moran, above n 71, at 270. 
81  Thakker, above n 75, at 160; Quinn, Forsyth and Mullen-Quinn, above n 74, at 218. 
82  Thakker, above n 75, at 160. 
83  Thakker, above n 75. 
84  Thakker, above n 75, at 160. 
85  R v Wilson, above n 2, at 1. 
86  Whanganui District Council v New Zealand Parole Board, above n 64, at [27]. 
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prolific sex offender, whose case has dominated news and print media, Wilson has come to be the 
public face of sex offenders in the country. Given the pervasiveness of Wilson's case, it is 
unsurprising the public supports the present Bill.  
IV  CONSISTENCY WITH NZBORA 
Conceptual understanding aside, it is important to analyse the practical effect of the Bill. The 
Bill imposes further detention on offenders after the expiration of their finite sentence, based on 
their predicted likelihood to reoffend. This very concept strikes at the heart of a number of Western 
legal traditions, most notably, an individual's right to liberty. For some, this concern may be 
lessened because the potential subjects of the Bill are sex offenders who have committed horrendous 
crimes. However, it is in respect of minorities, whom the majority of the population dislikes, that 
human rights are of greatest significance.87 The strength of a legal system is often judged by the 
extent to which it protects the rights of those very people and therefore, the effect of the Bill on 
individual rights must be assessed.  
In New Zealand, that assessment must be made in the context of NZBORA. NZBORA is a 
statutory bill of rights, enacted with the dual purpose of affirming, protecting and promoting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand, and affirming New Zealand's commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).88 Although, NZBORA is not 
supreme law, the Act contains the "notion of consistency with rights", as established by the 
operation of s 6, which requires courts to prefer meanings of legislation consistent with NZBORA 
where possible.89 The Attorney-General is also required to report to Parliament, at the introduction 
of a Bill, if any provision appears inconsistent with NZBORA.90 New Zealand courts have often 
been called to determine challenges to legislation made on the basis it infringes a NZBORA right or 
freedom.91 
The Bill raises three obvious issues – whether detention under a PPO or PDO is arbitrary within 
the meaning of s 22; whether such detention imposes a retroactive penalty as prohibited per s 26(1); 
and whether that constitutes punishing an individual for the same offence twice (double jeopardy) 
per s 26(2).92 For the Bill to be NZBORA compliant, detention under it must be construed as civil 
  
87  Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland [2004] HCA 46, (2005) 223 CLR 575 [Fardon] at 
[143]. 
88  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, long title [NZBORA]. 
89  Paul Rishworth "Human Rights" [2012] NZ L Rev 321 at 322. 
90  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 7. 
91  For example: R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA); Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1; 
Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2007] 1 NZLR 507 (CA) [Belcher]. 
92  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 22 and 26. 
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committal, rather than a form of punishment. If it is punishment, then the detention will necessarily 
be arbitrary, impose a retroactive penalty and punish an individual for the same crime twice. 
In March 2012, the Department of Corrections released a Regulatory Impact Statement on the 
Bill.93 This noted the risk PPOs could be construed as criminal, rather than civil orders, breaching 
the Government's obligations in NZBORA and the ICCPR.94 Nevertheless, Corrections 
recommended the scheme as the best of five options, including strengthening the ESO regime and 
creating a new continuing detention scheme.95  
After the Bill's introduction, the Government maintained PPOs were a form of civil detention. 
This focused on the purpose of the Bill, which is public protection, rather than punishment.96 
Specifically, because the Bill provided for detention in a civil detention facility and allowed 
individuals a high degree of autonomy, the Government argued it appropriately balanced the 
competing rights at stake.97 
In October 2012, the Attorney-General issued a statement explaining why, in his opinion, the 
Bill was consistent with NZBORA.98 This unusual decision is the inverse of the NZBORA s 7 duty 
and occurs rarely, for example when former Attorney-General Margaret Wilson made public her 
reasons for deeming the Foreshore and Seabed Bill 2004 to be NZBORA compliant.99 Mr Finlayson 
correctly held consistency with ss 22 and 26 of NZBORA depended on whether PPOs imposed a 
further penal sentence or were permissible civil committal.100 He concluded the "distinct provisions 
at each of the stages of the making, administration and withdrawal of detention orders … are 
characteristic of a committal, rather than a penal, regime".101 This was informed by the decision in 
Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (Belcher), which he regarded as the 
leading case on the distinction between penal and civil measures.102 
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The discussion will now move to the primary purpose of analysing the validity of the Attorney-
General's claim that PPOs are a form of civil committal and NZBORA compliant. The decision in 
Belcher will be considered, as well as case law from the United States and Australia.  
V IS POST-SENTENCE DETENTION CIVIL OR PENAL IN 
NATURE? 
The essential question in determining whether the Bill is compliant with NZBORA is whether 
the detention imposed under the Bill is civil or penal in nature. The first consideration must be the 
decision in Belcher, which was the primary basis for the Attorney-General's argument that such 
detention was civil.  
A Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections 
Belcher is a decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal, heard by five permanent members of 
the Court. The case concerned an appeal brought by Joseph Belcher in respect of an ESO imposed 
on him. Belcher challenged the ESO regime based on its alleged inconsistency with ss 22 and 26 of 
NZBORA.103 The Court resolved this question by considering whether an ESO amounted to 
punishment and unanimously held that it did.104 William Young P, giving the reasons of the Court, 
identified a number of factors supporting this conclusion.105 First, the event triggering an ESO was 
a criminal conviction and eligibility depended on an application before an offender's sentence 
expired or while they were subject to release conditions.106 Secondly, the consequences of an ESO 
were "in effect a subset of the sanctions which can be imposed on offenders", including up to 12 
months' home detention.107 Ultimately, it was thought the "imposition through the criminal justice 
system of significant restrictions (including detention) on offenders in response to criminal 
behaviour" amounted to punishment.108 
The Attorney-General observed some of the Belcher factors applied to PPOs. Detention under 
the Bill has a strong link to prior offending: it is also triggered by a criminal conviction and the 
order must be applied for while an individual is nearing release or subject to an ESO.109 The 
restrictions the Bill imposes on an individual's liberty are more extreme than ESOs and include 
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"prison-like" conditions, such as seclusion and restraint.110 An individual is detained either in a 
residence on prison grounds, or as a last resort, in prison.111 
While these factors suggest the Bill can be construed as penal, Mr Finlayson considered other 
provisions negated this. First, the requirement an individual "exhibits a severe disturbance in 
behavioural functioning" distinguishes it from ESOs and brings it in line with civil committal 
regimes.112 Secondly, the prison-like conditions of a PPO are mitigated by giving effect to the 
autonomy and quality of life of the individual.113 Thirdly, the making of a PPO is "distinct from the 
penal and parole system" unlike ESOs, which are made by the court that imposed the sentence of 
imprisonment that triggered eligibility for an ESO.114 While the Attorney-General was correct in 
asserting the significance of the separation of the making PPOs from the penal system, his other two 
arguments are not as certain and require further attention.  
B Case Law from Comparable Jurisdictions 
While the decision in Belcher provides a starting point for analysing the Attorney-General's 
statement, there is a wealth of case law from other jurisdictions to be considered. The United States 
and Australia are especially relevant as both have post-sentence detention regimes for sex offenders, 
which raise similar human rights issues. National courts in both countries, and the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations (UNHRC), have adjudicated on the human rights consistency of 
the schemes. In the absence of any direct New Zealand authority, these decisions provide valuable 
guidance. Before these decisions are taken into account, the background to the legislative schemes 
will be explained. 
1 The United States 
The United States has a long history of civil committal for recidivist sex offenders, dating back 
to the 1930s.115 The current schemes were developed in the 1990s and focus on sex offenders seen 
as too dangerous to release.116 Washington was the first state to enact such legislation in 1990,117 
which sparked a wave of similar legislation across various states. Presently, 20 states have some 
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form of post-sentence detention for sex offenders and in 2006 a federal detention programme was 
created.118 
In Kansas v Hendricks (Hendricks), the Supreme Court held by a majority of 5–4 that such laws 
were constitutional as a form of civil committal.119 The decision concerned the Sexually Violent 
Predators Act (SVPA) enacted by Kansas in 1994, which enabled indefinite detention of sex 
offenders likely to engage in "repeat acts of sexual violence" because of a "mental abnormality" or 
"personality disorder".120 Leroy Hendricks argued the Act was unconstitutional on three grounds – 
it breached his "substantive" due process rights (right to liberty), amounted to double jeopardy and 
was ex post facto (retrospective) legislation.121 Thomas J gave the opinion for the majority, 
rejecting all three arguments. The minority, in an opinion given by Breyer J, dissented with regard 
to the latter two arguments.  
Under the SVPA, an individual found be a sexually violent predator by the court, is placed in 
the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitative Services for "control, care and treatment" 
until they no longer pose any danger.122 Such individuals may be detained by the Department of 
Corrections under an interagency agreement, meaning detention takes place in prison, although 
individuals are to be housed and managed separately from regular offenders.123 In practice, 
detention takes place in the psychiatric wing of a prison hospital, where individuals detained under 
the SVPA are treated in the same way as ordinary prisoners.124  
2 Australia 
Post-sentence detention legislation for sex offenders began in Australia in 2003 when 
Queensland passed the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act (DPSOA).125 Similar 
legislation has been passed in New South Wales,126 Victoria127 and Western Australia.128 The 
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DPSOA enables the court to order the indefinite detention of a prisoner considered a serious danger 
to the community.129 There must be an unacceptable risk the prisoner will commit a serious sexual 
offence if released, as demonstrated by evidence, to a high degree of probability.130 While subject 
to an order of indefinite detention, an individual is detained in prison and retains the status of a 
prisoner, even though their sentence has expired.131 
The constitutionality of the DPSOA was challenged in Fardon v Attorney-General for the State 
of Queensland (Fardon) in the High Court of Australia.132 Robert Fardon, detained under the 
DPSOA, argued the Act was unconstitutional because the function it conferred on the Supreme 
Court was incompatible with the Supreme Court's position under the Constitution.133 The case 
turned on that narrow point and the majority of the Court, Kirby J dissenting, upheld the 
constitutionality of the DPSOA. In his dissent, Kirby J discussed the human rights implications of 
the Act and convincingly argued it was invalid. The crux of his argument was that because the 
DPSOA allowed for continuing prison detention, it was clearly punitive and amounted to 
retroactively imposed double punishment.134 
In 2007, Fardon and Kenneth Tillman, an individual detained under the New South Wales 
equivalent legislation, submitted communications to the UNHRC under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR.135 They alleged Australia had breached their right to be free from arbitrary detention and 
double jeopardy.136 The UNHRC found the continuing detention schemes breached these rights, as 
well as the prohibition of retroactive penalties.137  
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VI MENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR CIVIL COMMITTAL 
Returning to the Attorney-General's statement, the first issue for consideration is the whether the 
Bill establishes a form of civil committal. The Attorney-General believed that it did because of the 
cl 13 requirement that an individual exhibit a "severe disturbance in behavioural functioning". This 
is based on the traditional understanding of civil committal, which applies to individuals with some 
form of mental impairment. 
A New Zealand 
In New Zealand, civil committal of those with a mental disorder is provided for in the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (Mental Health Act). Mental disorder is 
defined as:138 
An abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature), characterised by 
delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, of such a degree that it–– 
(a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or others; or  
(b) seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or herself. 
Case law has indicated the definition purposefully avoids requiring a clinically diagnosed mental 
illness.139  
The phrase "mental disorder" is not mentioned in the Bill. In fact, a Cabinet Paper on the Bill 
states those detained under the Bill are unlikely to satisfy the requirements for civil committal under 
the Mental Health Act.140 This is an explicit recognition that the individuals whom PPOs are 
targeted at fall outside the existing scope of civil committal in New Zealand. This acknowledgment 
is of crucial importance for the Bill. If the Bill is to be construed as civil, it means the threshold for 
civil committal in New Zealand is necessarily being widened.   
B The United States 
This issue was also confronted in Hendricks, where a "mental abnormality or personality 
disorder" was required by the SVPA. Hendricks argued the SVPA was invalid because it lowered 
the traditional threshold for civil committal – a mental illness.141 Thomas J recognised a finding of 
dangerousness alone was insufficient for civil committal; an "additional factor" such as mental 
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illness was required.142 This served the purpose of limiting committal to individuals "who suffer 
from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control".143 In the majority's 
opinion, a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" sufficed as the "additional factor", 
because it would mean offenders were unable to control their dangerousness.144 The minority 
concurred with the majority on this point,145 which was later affirmed in Kansas v Crane.146 
This was problematic because the Kansas Legislature expressly acknowledged the SVPA 
applied to sex offenders "who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate 
for involuntary treatment" under Kansas' general civil committal statute.147 Hendricks too, then, 
lowers the standard for civil committal. 
C Is the Threshold Too Low? 
The decision in Hendricks has been the subject of intense scrutiny. Many mental health 
professionals believe it unacceptably widens the threshold for civil committal.148 Critics observe 
that while the meaning of mental illness is clear, with definitions, guidelines and evidentiary 
standards, "mental abnormality" is a legislative construct lacking the same characteristics.149 
Kennedy J, concurring with the majority in Hendricks, recognised this concern, stating the SPVA 
would be unconstitutional "if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to 
offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified".150 
The Bill is vulnerable to the same critique. While a mental illness is not required for civil 
committal in New Zealand, the Mental Health Act is clear as to what level of mental disorder is 
needed. This is a lower threshold than that applicable in the United States, and the Bill further 
reduces it.  This casts the net for civil commitment far too widely. Research demonstrates the 
majority of prisoners suffer from some sort of antisocial personality disorder and would satisfy 
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requirements such as a "mental abnormality" or "severe disturbance in behavioural functioning".151 
For example, a New Zealand study revealed 59.6 per cent of prisoners had at least one verified 
personality disorder diagnosis.152 This suggests a large percentage of the prison population could be 
caught by the lower mental standard required by the Bill. This is inherently problematic when the 
purpose of the requirement is to limit those eligible for civil committal and prevent individuals 
being detained on dangerousness alone.153 
This suggests the Attorney-General and the Court in Hendricks are wrong to conclude 
something less than the existing standard suffices to make the respective schemes forms of civil 
committal. If that is the case, it becomes easy to construe the schemes as merely a tool for the 
legislature to detain those it identifies as dangerous. Breyer J, dissenting in Hendricks, noted this 
concern.154 This is troubling because dangerousness is a tenuous basis for imprisonment, being 
based on predictions of future offending, which may never eventuate. Kirby J, dissenting in Fardon, 
regarded predictions of dangerousness as unreliable because they were often over predicted by 
psychiatrists and ultimately, only an "educated guess".155 The UNHRC echoed this sentiment, 
stating dangerousness is an "inherently problematic" concept for similar reasons.156 
D Concluding Remarks 
The mental requirement in cl 13 does not conclusively establish the Bill is a form of civil 
committal, contrary to the Attorney-General's assertion. However, it is important that the Bill, like 
the SVPA, includes some form of mental requirement. This contrasts with the schemes operating in 
Australia. For example, Queensland's DPSOA, while requiring psychiatric evidence to be 
considered, does not require a finding of any sort of mental condition.157 Kirby J was especially 
concerned by this major departure from the established principles of civil commitment in Australia 
and accordingly rejected the DPSOA as a form of civil committal.158 The Attorney-General's 
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argument the Bill is civil in nature, is at least in that respect, more credible than its Australian 
counterparts. 
VII DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT 
The Attorney-General's second reason in deciding detention under the Bill was civil was that its 
provisions give meaningful effect to the autonomy and quality of life of individuals. This nuanced 
argument contradicts the more obvious response that detention in a prison or a secure facility on 
prison grounds is the classic example of punishment, as suggested by theories of punishment.  
A Theories of Punishment  
The standard definition of punishment, developed by HLA Hart comprises five elements.159 
Specifically, punishment:160 
(a) must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant; 
(b) must be for an offence against legal rules; 
(c) must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence; 
(d) must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender; and 
(e) must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which 
the offence is committed. 
Joel Feinberg accepted this definition, adding the qualification that punishment must serve an 
expressive function.161 Feinberg's thesis was that, in addition to involving "hard treatment" ("pain 
or other consequences"), punishment expresses resentment, indignation and the judgements of 
disapproval and reprobation.162 According to Feinberg, these elements of punishment need not be 
distinct. The "hard treatment" an offender is subjected to may also express disapproval.163 In 
particular, Feinberg considered that certain forms of hard treatment, such as incarceration, have 
become entrenched as typical expressions of reprobation.164 Applied to the Bill, detention in a 
secure facility on prison grounds or in prison satisfies the formalistic and expressive requirements of 
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punishment. Thus, according to theory, the Bill and other post-sentence detention schemes are 
straightforward examples of punishment.  
Courts have attempted to circumvent this issue by focusing on the purpose of detention. While 
incapacitation is a common purpose of civil committal and imprisonment, retribution and deterrence 
are purposes of only imprisonment. Therefore, in order to conceive the schemes as civil committal, 
courts have held that retribution and deterrence are not applicable purposes. 
According to retributive theorists, the foundation for imposing punishment is that the offender 
deserves to be punished because they have committed a crime.165 This includes an element of 
proportionality – offenders should be punished according to their culpability and the seriousness of 
their offence.166 In Hendricks, the majority found no retributive purpose in the SVPA because it did 
"not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct".167 Instead, the prior offending was only evidence 
used to support a finding of dangerousness or the existence of mental abnormality or personality 
disorder.168 Another reason the schemes are not retributive, as per Callinan and Heydon JJ in 
Fardon, is that their purpose is not to impose detention on individuals who deserve punishment, but 
rather to protect the public.169  
Deterrence encompasses the idea that punishment has a crime-preventive consequence,170 by 
acting as a disincentive for criminal offending.171 This applies at a specific level, in terms of the 
individual offender, and at a general level, in terms of other would-be offenders.172 In Hendricks, 
the Court rejected any deterrent purpose, because the Act applied to offenders with no control over 
their actions (due to a mental abnormality or a personality disorder), who would not be deterred by 
the threat of confinement.173 This argument is plausible; theory posits deterrence is necessarily 
limited by the extent to which the targeted offender or would-be offenders consider the risk of 
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punishment rationally.174 In particular, deterrence is ineffective where the targeted offenders suffer 
from a mental condition that affects their ability to obey the law.175 
In Hendricks, having rejected the applicability of the "two primary objectives of criminal 
punishment", the majority deferred to the Kansas Legislature's framing of the SVPA as civil.176 
This approach can similarly be applied to the Bill. Clauses 4 and 5 explicitly disclaim any 
retributive purpose and for the reasons enunciated by the majority in Hendricks, a deterrent purpose 
is inapplicable. Therefore, there is a case for deferring to the Government's framing of the Bill as 
civil.  
However, the decision in Belcher precludes this analysis. In finding ESOs to be a form of 
punishment, the Court held it was not "decisive that the aim of the ESO scheme is to reduce 
offending … as opposed to the direct sanctioning of the offender for the purposes of denunciation, 
deterrence or holding to account".177 In fact, many criminal law sanctions, such as preventive 
detention and supervision, have a similar aim but are still considered penalties.178 This conclusion is 
supported by various academics including Patrick Keyzer, who unequivocally states "[p]rison does 
not stop being punitive because the parliaments or courts characterise the purpose of imprisonment 
as non-punitive".179 Therefore, in New Zealand, an argument the Bill is civil because its purpose is 
protective or non-punitive is unlikely to succeed. 
This approach is superior to that in Hendricks. The majority's decision to uphold the SVPA as 
civil, based on the purpose of detention being non-punitive, was flawed. It ignores the larger issue at 
stake – that an individual is being detained in a prison hospital, with other prisoners, potentially 
indefinitely, after his or her sentence has expired. It is hollow to contend this is not punitive, solely 
because its alleged purpose is not retribution or deterrence. If the detention amounts to punishment 
in substance, its purpose should not matter. Furthermore, the finding the SVPA had no retributive 
purpose was artificial at best. It is plausible it does serve a retributive purpose – to imprison sex 
offenders who "deserve" to be "locked up" based on their past crimes. This punitive intent was 
certainly reflected in statements of the Attorney General for Kansas who stated, "we cannot open 
our prison doors and let these animals back into the community".180 The majority should have taken 
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a more rigorous approach, such as the Court in Belcher, rather than deferring to the Kansas 
legislature's framing of the SVPA as civil.  
B Substantive Analysis of Detention under the Bill 
Breyer J, for the Hendricks minority, took this approach and focused on how the SVPA operated 
in practice. He noted detention under the SVPA was similar to imprisonment; it was "secure 
confinement … against one's will".181 This, combined with the location of detention, in a prison, 
meant it could be construed as punishment.182 The Attorney-General correctly followed this 
approach, but reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the "prison-like conditions" of detention 
under the Bill, which appeared punitive in substance, were displaced by the focus on the individual's 
autonomy and rights.183  
To evaluate this argument it is important to distinguish between PPOs and PDOs, the Attorney-
General's argument being more persuasive with regards to the former. PPO detainees will live in a 
residence on prison grounds, completely separate from existing prisoners. They are entitled to rights 
prisoners are not, such as the right to vote and obtain a benefit. Individuals are to have as much 
autonomy and quality of life as possible, while providing for security concerns. The combination of 
these factors suggests that residents will be able to have a more normal, functioning daily life than 
prisoners.  
However, as noted by the New Zealand Law Society in its submission to the Justice and 
Electoral Select Committee, "[m]any aspects of civil liberty have been removed" from residents.184 
Further, the Aotearoa Human Rights Lawyers Association noted that residences are situated on 
prison grounds and residents are, like prisoners, in the custody of the Chief Executive of the 
Department of Corrections.185 These points led both organisations to conclude that PPOs were 
penal in nature. This is a balanced point and the argument remains that detention under a PPO is 
different enough to prison detention so as not to be considered a form of punishment. For example, 
the Law Society opined that detention would be non-punitive if "living conditions" are 
"significantly better than those in prisons".186 For the reasons given above, it is likely that 
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conditions will be better than those in prisons and as such, detention under a PPO can be construed 
as non-punitive.  
However, the same cannot be said with regards to PDOs. Although only imposed as a last resort, 
PDOs require detention in a prison. Individuals are to be treated as a prisoner awaiting trial (a 
remand prisoner), with the same rights entitlements as those subject to a PPO, to the extent that the 
rights are consistent with the Corrections Act 2004. Many of the rights entitlements of those subject 
to a PPO have an equivalent provision in the Corrections Act: there are provisions for individuals to 
work;187 have reasonable access to the news;188 receive visitors;189 and receive mail and make 
telephone calls,190 subject to some degree of monitoring.191 However, the Corrections Act also 
imposes a variety of restrictions, such that the rights it confers are not as meaningful as in the 
Bill.192 The focus is not on the autonomy and quality of life of the individual, but rather on ensuring 
prisoners' minimum entitlements are met.193 Most fundamentally, an individual subject to a PDO is 
kept within the confines of a prison building and their day-to-day life mirrors that of a regular 
prisoner.  
The distinguishing status of individuals subject to PDOs as remand, rather than sentenced, 
prisoners is of little practical difference. There is no distinction in the rights entitlement between 
classes of prisoners, barring that remand prisoners are allowed to vote.194 However, remand 
prisoners are housed separately from sentenced prisoners and are generally permitted to wear their 
own clothing while in prison.195 These differences are negligible. Wearing different clothing or 
being housed in a separate area within a prison does not change the fact such individuals live under 
the same conditions as prisoners, imposed on them by the same administration. Their liberty is 
restrained in the exact same way. Therefore, the detention of individuals under a PDO can be 
construed as imprisonment and punitive in nature. This is consistent with the findings of the 
UNHRC which emphasise that "prison is penal in character".196 
  
187  Corrections Act 2004, s 66. 
188  Corrections Act 2004, s 78.  
189  Corrections Act 2004, s 73. 
190  Corrections Act 2004, s 76-77. 
191  Corrections Act 2004, ss 106-108 and s 111-113. 
192  Section 69.  
193  Corrections Act 2004, s 69.  
194  Electoral Act 1993, s 81. 
195  Department of Corrections "Arriving in prison" <www.corrections.govt.nz>. 
196  Fardon Communication, above n 135, at [7.3]. 
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VIII  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BILL 
It is clear the Bill has implications for compliance with human rights standards. There are two 
particular issues – what mental requirement is needed for civil committal, and whether detention 
under the Bill is, in substance, punishment. 
It could be argued the Bill is an example of penal populism, where the Government, sensing the 
outrage in response to Wilson's pending release, acted to pass a Bill it knew would garner public 
support. The public's attitude towards offenders has become increasingly punitive, and the National-
led Government has responded to this in the past, both in its electoral campaigns and in the "three 
strikes" regime. This suggestion is also strengthened by the common misconceptions the public has 
regarding sex offenders, such as their inability to be rehabilitated. If this were the case, the Bill 
would be a worrying example of the tyranny of the majority, perpetuated over the unpopular 
minority of sex offenders, with little principled basis. 
However, it would be wrong to characterise the Bill in such a way. Its provisions plainly 
demonstrate the Government has engaged with NZBORA concerns and tried to reduce 
inconsistencies. The inclusion of some form of mental requirement to trigger the application of the 
Bill demonstrates New Zealand has learnt from the Australian equivalent statutes, which contain no 
such requirement. Even though the Bill widens the threshold for civil committal by deviating from 
the standard in the Mental Health Act, it does not so as dramatically as the various state schemes in 
the United States. For example, in Kansas, the SVPA lowers the standard for civil committal from a 
mental illness to a "mental abnormality or personality disorder" and has been subject to much 
criticism on this basis.197 
The Government must also be given credit for developing a completely separate scheme of 
detention for PPOs. This ensures such detention is not substantively the same as imprisonment. 
However, questions remain with respect to whether PDOs are substantively different from 
imprisonment; this paper suggests they are not. PDOs are closer to the United States and Australian 
schemes where those detained are treated the same as existing prisoners. A redeeming factor for the 
Bill is that PDOs are not envisaged as the norm and only imposed as a last resort, when all other less 
restrictive options have been considered or tried.198 This contrasts to the United States and 
Australian schemes, which do not require the consideration of less restrictive alternatives. Breyer J, 
dissenting in Hendricks, criticised the SVPA for not requiring consideration of post-release 
  
197  See for example McSherry and Keyzer, above n 148, at 61.  
198  Public Safety Bill, cl 72. 
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supervision or halfway houses.199 Likewise, the UNHRC held Australia should have demonstrated 
why "less intrusive" means than continuing imprisonment were insufficient to manage Fardon.200  
A regime providing for the post-sentence detention of sex offenders could be far more offensive 
to human rights than the contemplated Bill. It is hard to envisage a less restrictive scheme that 
achieves the same purpose as the Bill. The Australian equivalent schemes with no mental 
requirement and continued prison detention embody the worst possible option. The callousness of 
the Australian attitude was demonstrated by that Government's decision to ignore the UNHRC's 
findings that it had breached multiple arts of the ICCPR.201 Today, Fardon continues to be detained 
in prison. While there are some concerns with the New Zealand Bill, they do not demonstrate such a 
blatant disregard for human rights.  
IX CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to analyse the validity of the Attorney-General's claim that the 
Public Safety (Public Protection Order) Bill is consistent with human rights. At first glance, the 
concept of the Bill – the detention of sex-offenders beyond their finite sentences – suggested it 
would compromise core rights protected in NZBORA. However, on closer inspection, it is clear the 
Bill has been drafted to engage with and lessen these concerns. The Bill has emerged from the select 
committee process largely unchanged in this regard. The Attorney-General argued the Bill was a 
form of civil committal, and that the detention it imposed was different to imprisonment. For the 
most part, these arguments are correct. However, the Attorney-General's analysis could have been 
more thorough with regard to lowering the threshold for civil committal and the substantive effect 
of detention under PDOs, as discussed in this paper. On the whole, and in comparison to the 
schemes operating in the United States and Australia, the Bill strikes an appropriate balance 
between the competing interests at stake – public protection and human rights.   
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